Supreme Court plans to revisit its 1995 Hindutva verdict
Election 2014 | Written by A Vaidyanathan | Updated: February 01, 2014 23:22 IST
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New Delhi: The Supreme Court plans to revisit its 1995 judgement in which the court ruled that seeking vote in the name of Hinduism is not a corrupt practice. The court decided to constitute a larger bench to have a relook at its judgement in the wake of high voltage election campaign for the national elections due by May this year.
"It is a matter relating to elections. 2014 elections are important. Whether one can seek vote in the name of religion has to be considered in interpreting Section 123 (3) of the Representation of the People Act," the court order issued today said.
The Bombay High Court had set aside the election of Shiv Sena leader Manohar Joshi. The matter was then moved to Supreme Court, which in 1995 overturned the High Court order saying Hindutva is a way of life.
Since then, the issue was raised in the top court many times, including in 2002 when the court referred the matter to a seven-judge bench for clarity.
On Thursday, the issue was raised before a five-judge Constitution bench in a petition which then directed the Supreme Court registry to place the matter before the Chief Justice of India to constitute a seven-judge bench soon to look into it.
"It is a matter relating to elections. 2014 elections are important. Whether one can seek vote in the name of religion has to be considered in interpreting Section 123 (3) of the Representation of the People Act," the court order issued today said.
The Bombay High Court had set aside the election of Shiv Sena leader Manohar Joshi. The matter was then moved to Supreme Court, which in 1995 overturned the High Court order saying Hindutva is a way of life.
Since then, the issue was raised in the top court many times, including in 2002 when the court referred the matter to a seven-judge bench for clarity.
On Thursday, the issue was raised before a five-judge Constitution bench in a petition which then directed the Supreme Court registry to place the matter before the Chief Justice of India to constitute a seven-judge bench soon to look into it.
Supreme Court's seven-judge bench to revisit Hindutva judgement
Sunday, February 2, 2014 - 17:37 IST | Agency: PTI
Virtually reopening its Hindutva judgement, the Supreme Court has decided to expedite hearing by a seven judge-bench for an authoritative pronouncement on electoral law categorising misuse of religion for electoral gains as "corrupt practices".
The issue assumes importance as questions were raised on its 1995 verdict which held that vote in name of "Hindutva/ Hinduism" did not prejudicially affect any candidate and since then three election petitions are pending on the subject before the apex court. The apex court's three-judge bench in 1995 had held that "Hindutva/Hinduism is a way of life of the people in the sub-continent" and "is a state of mind."
The judgement was delivered in the case of Manohar Joshi versus NB Patil which was authored by Justice JS Verma who found that statement by Joshi that "First Hindu State will be established in Maharashtra did not amount to appeal on ground of religion." The observation was made while dealing with the question regarding the scope of corrupt practices mentioned in sub-section (3) of Section 123 of the 1951 Representation of People Act.
The issue for interpretation of sub-section (3) of Section 123 of the Act once again had come on January 30 (Friday) before a five-judge headed by Justice RM Lodha which referred it for examination before a larger bench of seven judge which will be constituted by chief justice P Sathasivam. The bench, also comprising justices AK Patnaik, S J Mukhopadhaya, Dipak Misra and FIM Kalifulla was dealing with the appeal filed in 1992 by BJP leader Abhiram Singh, whose election to 1990 Maharashtra Assembly was set aside in 1991 by the Bombay High Court.
A three-judge bench on April 16, 1992 had referred Singh's appeal in which the same question and interpretation of sub-section (3) of Section 123 of the Act was raised to a five-judge Constitution Bench.
While the five-judge bench was hearing this matter on January 30, it was informed that the identical issue was raised in the election petition filed by one Narayan Singh against BJP leader Sunderlal Patwa and the apex court's another Constitution Bench of five Judges has referred a larger Bench of seven Judges.
Thereafter, the bench headed by Justice Lodha referred Singh's matter to the Chief Justice for placing it before a seven-judge bench. "Be that as it may, since one of the questions involved in the present appeal is already referred to a larger Bench Of seven Judges, we think it appropriate to refer this appeal to a limited extent regarding interpretation of sub-section (3) of Section 123 of the 1951 Act to a larger Bench of seven Judges. "The Registry will place the matter before the Chief Justice for constitution of a Bench of seven Judges. The matter may be listed subject to the order of the Chief Justice," the January 30 order said.
It said,"In the course of arguments, our attention has been invited to the order of this Court dated August 20, 2002 in Narayan Singh vs. Sunderlal Patwa 1. By this order, a Constitution Bench of five Judges has referred the question regarding the scope of corrupt practice mentioned in sub-section (3) of Section 123 of the 1951 Act to a larger Bench of seven Judges. "This became necessary in view of the earlier decision of a Constitution Bench of this Court in Kultar Singh vs. Mukhtiar Singh," the bench said.
By V. M. Tarkunde, 19 January, 1996
The damage has been caused by three judgments: Dr. Ramesh Yashwant Prabhoo Vs Shri Prabhakar Kashinath Kunte and Others; Manohar Joshi Vs Nitin Bhaurao Patel & another; and Prof. Ramachandra G. Kapse Vs Haribansh Ramakbal Singh.
It is well understood in anthropology that the culture of the people includes their religion, their language, their arts and crafts, their ways of earning a living, and their behaviour with others. This means that culture includes religion, and that an appeal to vote on the basis of Hindutva includes an appeal to vote for the Hindu religion as well. Since an appeal to vote for Hindutva includes an appeal to vote for the Hindu religion, it clearly amounts to a corrupt practice as defined by section 123(3) of the Representation of the People Act 1951.
Supreme court judgment: a blow to secular democracy
By V. M. Tarkunde, 19 January, 1996
On December 11, 1995, a three judge Bench of the Supreme Court delivered judgments in a number of appeals which arose from decisions of the Bombay High Court relating to the validity of the elections of certain Shiv Sena -BJP candidates to the Maharashtra Legislative Assembly. The Bombay High Court had set aside the elections of these candidates mainly on the ground that they had committed a corrupt practice as defined by Section 123(3) of the Representation of the People Act, 1951. The corrupt practice defined in Section 123(3) consists of "the appeal by a candidate or his agent or by any other person with the consent of a candidate or his election agent to vote or refrain from voting for any person on the ground of his religion…"
By these judgements the Supreme Court Bench has watered down to a very material extent the rigour of the above provision in respect of candidates who stood for Hindutva or who appealed for the creation of a Hindu state. Larger Benches of the Supreme Court had previously held that secular democracy is one of the basic features of the Indian constitution, and that Section 123(3) of the Representation of this People Act was intended to uphold the principle of secular democracy. By watering down the meaning and the rigour of what provision, the present three-judge Bench of the Supreme Court has dealt a very severe blow to the principle of secular democracy.
The damage has been caused by three judgments: Dr. Ramesh Yashwant Prabhoo Vs Shri Prabhakar Kashinath Kunte and Others; Manohar Joshi Vs Nitin Bhaurao Patel & another; and Prof. Ramachandra G. Kapse Vs Haribansh Ramakbal Singh.
In the case of Dr. Ramesh Yeshwant Prabhoo the Supreme Court bench dealt with the meaning of the word "Hindutva" or "Hinduism" when used in election propaganda. The court came to the conclusion that the words "Hinduism" or "Hindutva" are not necessarily to be understood and construed narrowly, confined only to the strict Hindu religious practices unrelated to the culture and ethos of the People of India depicting the way of life of the Indian people. Unless the context of a speech indicates a contrary meaning or use, in the abstract, these terms are indicative more of a way of life of the Indian people. Unless the context of a speech indicates a contrary meaning or use, in the abstract, these terms are indicative more of a way of life of the Indian people and are not confined merely to describe persons practicing the Hindu religion as a faith" (Emphasis supplied). This clearly means that, by itself, the word "Hinduism" or "Hindutva" indicates the culture of the people of India as a whole, irrespective of whether they are Hindus, Muslims, Christians, Jews etc. The Supreme Court Bench has further observed that "the mere fact that these words (Hindutva or Hinduism) are used in the speech would not bring in within the prohibition of sub-section (3) or (3A) of Section 123. It may well be that these words are used in the speech to promote secularism and to emphasize the way of life of the Indian people and the Indian culture or ethos, or to criticize the policy of any political party as discriminatory or intolerant. Whether a particular speech in which a reference is made to Hindutva and or Hinduism falls within the prohibition under sub-section (3) or (3A) of Section 123 is therefore a question of fact in each case" (Emphasis supplied).
These conclusions of the Supreme Court Bench clearly mean that if a candidate were to declare that he believed in Hindutva and therefore the voters should cast their votes in his favour, without saying anything more, he would not be committing any corrupt practice as defined by the Section 123 (3) of the Act. He may, according to the Supreme Court Bench, be referring to the culture of the Indian people as a whole including Muslims, Christians and all other non-Hindu citizens. Can this conclusion be accepted as correct?
In the first place, any statement made before an audience should be interpreted in the sense in which the members of t he audience are expected to understand it. During an electoral campaign the purpose of almost every meeting is to appeal for the votes of the electorate. Would the normal electorate in India understand that what is meant by Hindutva is the culture of all the people of India including those of non-Hindu faiths? Obviously, by Hindutva most of the voters would understand the culture of Hindus including their religious faith, and not the faith and culture of non-Hindus.
Even an audience more educated than the average Indian voters would understand by Hindutva the culture (including the religion) of HINDUS AND not of non-Hindus. In Particular, Hindutva cannot be understood by them as inclusive of the culture and religion of those whose religion originated outside India, such as Muslims, Christians and Jews.
It is well understood in anthropology that the culture of the people includes their religion, their language, their arts and crafts, their ways of earning a living, and their behaviour with others. This means that culture includes religion, and that an appeal to vote on the basis of Hindutva includes an appeal to vote for the Hindu religion as well. Since an appeal to vote for Hindutva includes an appeal to vote for the Hindu religion, it clearly amounts to a corrupt practice as defined by section 123(3) of the Representation of the People Act 1951.
The conclusion that Hindutva or Hinduism means the culture of all the people of India (and not Hindus alone) is derived by the present three-judge Bench from two previous decisions of five-judge Benches of the Supreme Court - Sastri Yagnapurushadji and others Vs Muldas Bhudarda Vaishya and another, 1966 (3) SCR 242; and Commissioner of Wealth tax, Madras and others Vs late R. Sridharan by LPs, 1976 (Sipp.) SCR 478. Neither of these decisions support the conclusion of the Supreme Court that Hindutva or Hinduism means the culture of the people of India as a whole.
In Sastri Yagnapurushadji's case, a Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court held that Swaminarayan sect is a part of Hindu religion. It was observed in the judgement in that case that originally the word 'Hindu' arose from the river Indus and the residents around the river were called Hindus. That observation has hardly any relevance to what Hinduism or Hindutva means today. Moreover, the judgement in that case refers to many authorities and concludes that the Hindu religion does not claim any prophet, it does not satisfy the traditional features of any religion or creed, and that "it may broadly be described as a way of life and nothing more". The present three-judge Bench has relied on these and other observations in the aforesaid judgement and come to the conclusion that Hinduism is a way of life of all Indians.
In deriving this conclusion, the present three-judge Bench has overlooked the fact that the same judgement has also described what the essential features of the Hindu religion are. The judgment says: "Beneath the diversity of philosophers who started different philosophic schools, lie certain broad concepts which can be treated as basic" (p. 263). The judgement in that case goes on to say that amongst these basic concepts is the acceptance of Vedas as the highest authority in religious and philosophical matters and also the belief in rebirth and pre-existence. The judgement also mentions that according to the Hindu religion, the ultimate object of humanity is "the release and freedom from the unceasing cycle of births and rebirths; Moksha or Nirvana, which is the ultimate aim of Hindu religion "can be safely described as a way of life based on certain basic concepts to which we have already referred" (p.265 emphasis supplied). These observations clearly mean that the Hindu religion, in spite of its diversity of doctrines, has some basic concepts which are common to all Hindus and which guide their way of life. Obviously these concepts are different from those of Muslims, Christians and other religious communities. It is, therefore, not right to adduce from this judgment that Hinduism is the way of life of the present Indian citizens belonging to different religions.
No such conclusion can also be derived from the other case, the Commissioner of Wealth Tax and others. In that case, a father and his son born from a Christian wife was held to form a joint Hindu family for the purpose of wealth tax. The extracts from authoritative texts quoted in this case also show that Hinduism is the civilization of Hindus and it includes their religion and other cultural traits. Moreover, both this as well as the earlier case of Sastri Yagnapurushadji quote with approval the definition of Hindu religion given by B. G. Tilak in Geetarahasya which is as follows: "Acceptance of the Vedas with reverence; recognition of the fact that the means of ways of salvation are divers; and realization of the truth that the number of gods to be worshipped is large, that indeed is the distinguishing feature of Hindu religion". It is clear that this case also does not support the conclusion of the three-judge Bench that Hindutva or Hinduism means the culture not only of Hindus but of the Indian people as a whole.
The present three-judge Bench was therefore wrong in holding that an appeal for votes based on Hindutva or Hinduism does not by itself amounts to a corrupt practice as defined in Section 123(3) of the Representation of the People Act 1951.
Turning to the decision of the three-judges Bench in Manohar Joshi's case, it was an admitted fact that Manohar Joshi whose election had been set a side by the Bombay High Court but now restored by the Supreme Court had admittedly state din one of his election speeches that "the first Hindu State will be established in Maharashtra". This clearly means that if the electorate voted in favour of Manohar Joshi and the other candidates of the Shiv Sena- BJP combine, they would establish a Hindu State in Maharashtra and that it will be the first Hindus State in any part of India. The voters who wanted a Hindu State were thus invited to vote for him and for the Shiv Sena - BJP combine. The Supreme Court, however, held that this was not an appeal on the ground of religion. It observed, "In our opinion, a mere statement that the first Hindu State will be established in Maharashtra is by itself not an appeal for votes on the ground of religion, but the expression at best of such a hope. It is indeed very strange that the expression of the hope that the voters will succeed in creating a Hindu State in Maharashtra was not held by the Supreme Court to be an appeal to vote for the creation of such a State. The decision is unsupportable. As explained by the Supreme Court itself in other cases, secularism means that while the people are entitled to profess, practice and propagate their religion, the State will have no religion of its own. An appeal for the creation of secular democracy and is a corrupt practice under section 123(3) of the Act.
In the case of Prof. Ramchandra Kapse, one of the questions which arose for decision was whether the election of a candidate can be set aside on the basis of what was state dint he election manifesto of the party of which he was a candidate. Prof. Kapse was a BJP candidate and the BJP in its election manifesto had appealed for votes by referring to the Ramjanma Bhoomi - Babri Masjid issue. The three-judge Bench proceeded on the basis that the manifesto did contain on appeal to vote on the basis of religion. But the Bench gave two reasons for holding that Prof. Kapse did not commit any corrupt practice on account of his party's election manifesto. Firstly, the Bench observed that the BJP was registered as a party by the election commission under Section 29A of the Representation of the People Act 1951, which required that the principles of socialism, secularism and democracy, among others, should be expressly endorsed in the constitution of every party which applied for registration. Secondly, the Supreme Court Bench observed that no part in the drafting of manifesto or specific vies in the election campaign were attributed to Prof. Kapse. Now, Section 29 A does not require the Election Commission to make any enquiry on whether, after the registration, the party continues to act according to the principles embodied in its constitution such as secularism and democracy. The fact that Dr. Kapse was not alleged to have participate din the drafting of the manifesto or made use of the manifesto in the election was also not decisive of the question whether he used religion for the purpose of securing votes. When a candidate accepts the ticket of a party, he obviously accepts the election manifesto of the party . The election manifesto is circulated amongst the voters. The circulation of the manifesto must, under the circumstances, be held to have been done with the candidate's consent. It is proper to hold that every candidate who accepts the ticket of a party endorses what is stated in the party's election manifesto accepts the party's ticket. If the view of the Supreme Court in this behalf is accepted, the result would be that a candidate may succeed with the help of a manifesto which appeals for votes on account of his religion and yet his election would be valid.
These decisions of the Supreme Court Bench are thus highly derogatory to the principle of secular democracy and the letter and spirit of Section 123(3) of the Representation of the People Act 1951. It is to be hoped that a larger Bench of the Supreme Court will on a future occasion reconsider these decisions and undo the great harm caused by them. .
Arun Shourie
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A case in which the English version of a major book by a renowned Muslim scholar, the fourth Rector of one of the greatest centers of Islamic learning in India, listing some of the mosques, including the Babri Masjid, which were built on the sites and foundations of temples, using their stones and structures, is found to have the tell-tale passages censored out.
The book is said to have become difficult to get.
It is traced: And it is found to have been commended just 15 years ago by the most influential Muslim scholar of our country today, the current Rector of the great center of Islamic learning, and the Chairman of the Muslim Personal Law Board.
Evasion, concealment have become a national habit. And they have terrible consequences. But first I must give you some background. The National Ulama of Lucknow is one of the principal centers of Islamic learning in India. It was founded in 1894. It ranks today next only to the Darul-Ulum at Deoband. The government publication, Centers of Islamic Learning in India, recalls how the founders "aimed at producing capable scholars who could project a true image of Islam before the modern world in an effective way'; it recalls how "Towards fulfilling its avowed aim in the matter of educational reform, it (the group) decided to establish an ideal educational institution which would not only provide education in religious and temporal sciences but also offer technical training"; it recalls how "It (Nadwa) stands out today -- with its college, a vast and rich library and Research and Publication Departments housed in fine buildings -- as one of the most outstanding institutions for imparting instruction in the Islamic Sciences"; it recalls how "A salient feature of this institution is its emphasis on independent research"; it recalls how "The library of the Nadwa, housed in the central hall and the surrounding rooms of the main building, is, with more than 75,000 titles including about 3,000 handwritten books mostly in Arabic and also in Persian, Urdu, English etc., one of the finest libraries of the sub-continent". That was written 10 years ago. The library now has 125,000 books.
Its Head
Today the institution is headed by Maulana Abdul-Hasan Ali Nadwi. Ali Mian, as he is known to one and all, is almost without any doubt the most influential Muslim teacher and figure today -- among the laity, in government circles, and among scholars and governments abroad.
He was among the founders of Jamaat-e-Islami, the fundamentalist organization; but because of differences with Maulana Maudoodi, he left soon. Today he is the chairman of the Muslim Personal Law Board. He is a founder member of the Raabta Alam-e-Islami, the Pan-Islamic body with headquarters in Mecca, which decides among other things the amounts that different Islamic organizations the world over should receive. He has been the Nazim, that is the Rector, of the Darul-Ulum Nadwatul-Ualama since 1961, that is for well over a quarter of a century. The Nadwa owns not a small part of its eminence to the scholarship, the exertions, the national and international contacts of Ali Mian.
Politicians of all hues -- Rajiv Gandhi, V P Singh, Chandrasekhar seek him out. He is the author of several books, including the well known Insani Duniya Par Musalmanon Ke Uruj-Zaval Ka Asar (The Impact of the Rise and Fall of Muslims on Mankind), and is taken as the authority on Islamic law, jurisprudence, theology, and specially history. And he has great, in fact decisive, influence on the politics of Muslims in India.
His father, Maulana Hakim Sayed Abdul Hai, was an equally well known and influential figure. When the Nadwa was founded, the first Rector, Maulana Muhammed Monghyri, the scholar at whose initiative the original meeting in 1892 which led to establishment of the Nadwa was called, had chosen Maulana Abdul Hai as the Madagar Nazim, the additional Rector. Abdul Hai served in that capacity till July 1915 when he was appointed the Rector. Because of his scholarship and his services to the institution and to Islam, he was reappointed as the Rector in 1920. He continued in that post till his death in February 1923. He too wrote several books, including a famous directory which has just been republished from Hyderabad, of thousands of Muslims who had served the cause of Islam in India, chiefly by the numbers they had converted to the faith.
During some work, I came across the reference to a book of his and began to look for it. It was a long, discursive book, I learnt, which began with descriptions of geography, flora and fauna, languages, people and regions of India. These were written for Arabic speaking people, the book having been written in Arabic.
In 1972, I learnt, the Nadwatul-Ulama had the book translated into Urdu and published the most important chapters of the book under the title Hindustan Islami Ahad Mein ("Hindustan Under Islamic Rule"). Ali Mian, I was told, had himself written the foreword in which he had commended the book most highly. The book as published had left out description of geography etc, on the premise that facts about these are well known to Indian readers.
A curious fact hit me in the face. Many of the persons who one would have normally expected to be knowledgeable about such publications were suddenly reluctant to recall this book. I was told, in fact, that copies of the book had been removed, for instance from the Aligarh Muslim University Library. Some even suggested that a determined effort had been made three or four years ago to get back each and every copy of this book.
Fortunately the suggestion turned out to be untrue. While some of the libraries one would normally expect to have the book -- the Jamia Millia Islamia in Delhi; the famous libraries in Hyderabad -- those of the Dairutual Maarifal-Osmania, of the Salar Jung Museum, of the Nizam's Trust, of the Osmania University, the Kutubkhana-I-Saidiya -- did not have it, others did. Among the latter were the Nadwa's library itself, the justly famous Khuda Baksh Library in Patna, that of the Institute of Islamic Studies in Delhi.
The fact that the book was available in all these libraries came as a great reassurance. I felt that if reactionaries and propagandists have become so well organized that they can secure disappearance from every library of a book they have come not to like, we are in deep trouble. Clearly they were not that respectful. The fact that, contrary to what I had been told, the book was available also taught me another reassuring thing: factional fights among Muslim fundamentalists are as sharp and intense as are the factional fights among fundamentalists of other hues. For the suggestion of there being something sinister in the inaccessibility of the book had come to me from responsible Muslim quarters.
The book is the publication number 66 of the Majlis Tehqiqat wa Nashriat Islam, the publication house of the Nadwatul-Ulama, Lucknow. The Arabic version was published in 1972 in Hyderabad, the Urdu version in 1973 in Lucknow. An English version was published in 1977. I will use the Urdu version as the illustration. Maulana Abdul-Hasan Ali Nadwi, that is Ali Mian himself contributes the foreword. It is an eloquent, almost lyrical foreword.
Islam has imbued its followers with the quest for truth, with patriotism, he writes. Their nature, their culture has made Muslims the writers of true history, he writes. Muslims had but to reach a country, he writes, and its fortunes lit up and it awakened from the slumber of hundreds an thousands of years. The country thereby ascended from darkness to light, he writes, from oblivion and obscurity to the pinnacle of name and fame. Leaving its parochial ambit, he writes, it joined the family of man, it joined the wide and vast creation of God. And the luminescence of Islam, he writes, transformed its hidden treasure into the light of eyes. It did not suck away the wealth of the country, he writes, and vomit it elsewhere as western powers did. On the contrary, it brought sophistication, culture, beneficent administration, peace, tranquility to the country. It raised the country from the age of savagery to the age of progress, he writes, from infantilism to adulthood. It transformed its barren lands into swaying fields, he writes, its wild shrubs into fruit-laden trees of such munificence that the residents could not even have dreamt of them.
And so on.
He then recalls that the vast learning and prodigious exertions of Maulana Abdul Hai, his 8-volume work on 4500 Muslims who served the cause of Islam in India, his directory of Islamic scholars. He recalls how after completing these books the Maulana turned to subjects which had till then remained obscure, how in these labors the Maulana was like the proverbial bee collecting honey from varied flowers. He recounts the wide range of the Mualana's scholarship. He recounts how the latter collected rare data, how a person like him accomplished single-handed what entire academics are unable these days to do.
He recounts the structure of the present book. He recalls how it lay neglected for long, how, even as the work of retranscribing a moth-eaten manuscript was going on, a complete manuscript was discovered in Azamgarh, how in 1933 the grace of Providence saved it from destruction and obscurity.
He writes that the book brings into bold relief those hallmarks of Islamic rule which have been unjustly and untruthfully dealt with by western and Indian historians, which in fact many Muslim historians and scholars in universities and academics too have treated with neglect and lack of appreciation.
Recalling how Maulana Abdul Hai had to study thousands of pages on a subject, Ali Mian says that only he who has himself worked on the subject can appreciate the effort that has gone into the study. You will get in a single chapter of this book, he tells the reader, the essence which you cannot obtain by reading scores of books. This is the result, he writes, of the fact that the author labored only for the pleasure of the God, for the service of the learning, and the fulfillment of his own soul. Such authors expected no rewards, no applause, he tells us. Work has their entire satisfaction. That is how they were able to put in such Herculean labors, to spend their entire life on one subject. We are immensely pleased, he concludes, to present this valuable gift and historical testament to our countrymen and hope that Allah will accept this act of service and scholars will also receive it with respect and approbation.
Such being the eminence of the author, such being the greatness of the work, why is it not the cynosure of the fundamentalists' eyes ?
The answer is in the chapter "Hindustan ki Masjidein" , The Mosques of Hindustan (India).
Barely seventeen pages; the chapter is simply written. A few facts about some of the principal mosques are described in a few lines each.
The facts are well-known, they are elementary, and setting them out in few lines each should attract no attention. And yet as we shall see, there is a furtiveness in regard to them. Why? Descriptions of seven mosques provide the answer.
The devout constructed so many mosques, Maulana Abdul Hai records, they lavished such huge amounts and such labors on them that they cannot be all reckoned, that every city, town, hamlet came to be adorned by a mosque. He says that he will therefore have to be content with setting out the facts of just a few of the well-known ones.
A few sentences from what he says about mosques will do:
"According to my findings the first mosque of Delhi is Qubbat al-Islam or Quwwat al-Islam which, it is said, Qutub-Din Aibak constructed in H. 587 after demolishing the temple built by Prithvi Raj and leaving certain parts of the temple; and when he returned from Ghazni in H. 592, he started building, under orders from Shihabuddin Ghori, a huge mosque of inimitable red stones, and certain parts of the temple were included in the mosque. After that, when Shamsud-Din Altamish became the king, he built, on both sides of it, edifices of white stones, and on one side of it he started constructing the loftiest of all towers which has no equal in the world for its beauty and strength."
"This was built by Sultan Ibrahim Sharqi with chiseled stones. Originally, it was a Hindu temple after demolishing which he constructed the mosque. It is known as the Atala Masjid. The Sultan used to offer his Friday and Id prayers in it, and Qazi Shihbud-Din gave lessons in it"
"This mosque stands on an elevated ground inside the Fort of Kanauj. It is well-known that it was built on the foundations of some Hindu temple (that stood) here. It is a beautiful mosque. They say that it was built by Ibrahim Sharqi in H. 809 as is recorded in Gharbat Nigar. "
"This mosque stands on the bank of the Jamuna at Etawah. There was a Hindu temple at this place, on the site of which this mosque was constructed. It is also patterned after the mosque at Kanauj. Probably it is one of the monuments of the Sharqi Sultans."
"This mosque was constructed by Babar at Ayodhya which Hindus call the birth place of Ramchandraji. There is a famous story about his wife Sita. It is said Sita had a temple here in which she lived and cooked food for her husband. On that very site Babar constructed this mosque in H. 963 "
"It is said that the mosque of Benares was built by Alamgir on the site of Vishweshwar Temple. That temple was very tall and held as holy among the Hindus. On this very site and with those very stones he constructed a lofty mosque, and its ancient stones were rearranged after being embedded in the walls of the mosque. It is one of the renowned mosques of Hindustan. The second mosque at Beneras is the one which was built by Alamgir on the bank of Ganga with chiseled stones. This also is a renowned mosque of Hindustan. It has 28 towers, each of which is 238 feet tall. This is on the bank of the Ganga and its foundations extend to the depth of the waters. Alamgir built mosque at Mathura. It is said that this mosque was built on the site of the Gobind Dev Temple which was very strong and beautiful as well as exquisite"
But the Maulana is not testifying to the facts. He is merely reporting what was believed. He repeatedly says, "It is said that".
That seems to be a figure of speech with the Maulana. When describing the construction of the Quwwatul Islam mosque by Qutubuddin Aibak, for instance he uses the same "It is said".
If the facts were in doubt, would a scholar of Ali Mian's diligence and commitment not have commented on them in his fullbodied foreword? Indeed, he would have decided against republishing them as he decided not to republish much of the original book.
And if the scholars had felt that the passages could be that easily disposed of, why should any effort have been made to take a work to the excellence of which a scholar of Ali Mian's stature has testified in such a fullsome manner, and what has been done to this one? And what is that?
Each reference to each of these mosques having been constructed on the sites of temples with, as in the case of Benaras, the stones of the very temples which were demolished for that very purpose have been censored out of the English version of the book ! Each one of the passages on each one of the seven mosques!
Indeed there is not just censorship but substitution. In the Urdu volume we are told in regard to the mosque at Kanauj for instance that "This mosque stands on an elevated ground inside the fort of Kanauj. It is well known that it was built on the foundation of some Hindu temple that stood here." In the English version we are told in regard to the same mosque that "It occupied a commanding site, believed to have been the place earlier occupied by an old and decayed fort".
If the passages could have been explained away by referring to the "It is said", why would anyone have thought it necessary to remove these passages from the English version -- that is the version which is likely to be read by persons other than the faithful? Why would anyone bowdlerize the book of a major scholar in this way?
But that, though obvious, weighs little with me. The fact that temples were broken and mosques constructed in their place is well known. Nor is the fact that the materials of the temples -- the stones and the idols -- were used in constructing the mosque, news. It was thought that this was the way to announce hegemony. It was thought that this was the way to strike at the heart of the conquered -- for in those days the temple was not just a place of worship; it was the hub of the community's life, of its learning, of its social life. So the lines in the book which bear on this practice are of no earth-shaking significance in themselves. Their real significance -- and I dare say that they are but the smallest, most innocuous example that one can think of on the mosque-temple business -- lies in the evasion and concealment they have spurred. I have it on good authority that the passages have been known for long, and well known to those who have been stoking the Babri Masjid issue.
(Several other modern Muslim historians and epigraphists accept that the fact that many other mosques including the Babri Masjid at Ayodhya stand on the sites of Hindu temples.)
That is the significant thing; they have known them, and their impulse has been to conceal and bury rather than to ascertain the truth.
I have little doubt that a rational solution can be found for the Babri Masjid-Ram Janmabhoomi tangle, a solution which will respect the sentiments, the essentials, of the religions of all.
But no solution can be devised if the issue is going to be made the occasion for a show of strength by either side, if it is going to be converted into a symbol for establishing who shall prevail.
The fate of Maulana Abdul Hai's passages -- and I do not know whether the Urdu version itself was not a conveniently sanitized version of the original Arabic Volume -- illustrates the cynical manner in which those who spoke the passions of religion to further their politics are going about the matter.
Those who proceed by such cynical calculations sow havoc for all of us, for Muslims, for Hindus, for all. Those who remain silent in the face of such cynicism, such calculations help them sow the havoc.
Will we shed our evasions and concealment? Will we at last learn to speak and face the whole truth? To see how communalism of one side justifies and stokes that of the other? To see that these "leaders" are not interested in facts, not in the religion, not in a building or a site, but in power, in their personal power, and in that alone? That for them religion is but an instrument, an instrument which is so attractive because the costs of wielding it fall on others, on their followers, and not on them?
Will we never call a halt to them?
Hinduism and Hindutva: What the Supreme Court Says?
http://www.bjp.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=368:qhinduism-and-hindutva-what-the-supreme-court-says-q&Itemid=501
Ever since the Supreme Court delivered its judgement, on Dec.11, 1995, setting aside the decision of the Bombay High Court which had earlier held the election of the Maharashtra Chief Minister, Mr. Manohar Joshi, void, a number of articles have been appearing in the Press criticising the verdict in one form or the other. It is unfortunate that fault is being found with a clear, rational, fair, incisive and sound enunciation of law, constitution and culture of India by the apex court, and a false picture is being painted by some of the country's 'columnists' whose bias make them see what is not there in the judgement.
There is not one but seven unanimous judgements in thirteen cases. Three of them encompass the entire range and they are (i) Dr. R. Prabhoo vs K. Kunte; (ii) Manohar Joshi vs Patil; and (iii) R. Kapse vs H. Singh. In the first judgement, the appeal of Dr. Prabhoo has been rejected and he has been held guilty of using religion for securing electoral gains. Bal Thackeray, too, has been held guilty of corrupt practice under the election law. In the second and third judgements, the findings of the Bombay High Court have been overturned, and the elections of Manohar Joshi and Ram Kapse held valid. Four clear enunciations of election law emerge from these judgements. First, "the word 'Hinduism' by itself does not invariably mean Hindu religion and it is the context and manner of its use which is material". Secondly, "a mere statement that the first Hindu State will be established in Maharashtra is by itself not an appeal for votes on the ground of his (Manohar Joshi's) religion, but the expresssion, at best, of such a hope." Thirdly, if corrupt practices are sought to be proved on the basis of utterances of persons other than the candidate and his election agents, then it has also to be proved that the election results have been materially affected by such utterances. Fourthly, a person who is not a candidate has an independent right to prove that he is not guilty of corrupt practices. The third and fourth enunciations merely correct the legal omissions and are not subject-matter of much controversy. It is against the first and second enunciations that harsh criticism is being levelled. For example, in an article appearing in two instalments, in a national daily, Justice J.S. Verma has been specially singled out and berated and his enunciation rated lower than that of "an essay of an undergraduate in modern Indian history". All such criticism is wholly unmerited and speaks, as would be shown hereinafter, more of the criticism than of the unanimous verdict of the three-judges Bench which has been arrived at not in any mood of 'passionate intensity' but on legal and dispassionate considerations. Ragarding the first enunciation, the Supreme Court has merely stated that, while determining the meaning of Hindutva in a particular text, the Court should be guided by the context and the manner of its use. What is wrong with this plain and simple enunciation? The three-Judge Bench headed by Justice J.S. Verma has said nothing which is not justified or which is at variance with the previous stand or verdicts of the apex court. The unanimous view expressed by the three Judges regarding Hinduism and Hindutva are based upon the views expressed earlier by the Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court in quite a few cases. For example, in Shastri Yagna Purushadji case (1966(3) SCR 242) and in Sridharan case (1976 SCR 478), the Constitution Bench took the same view and quoted practically the same authorities - Monier Wiliam, Dr Radhakrishnan, Encyclopaedia Britannica, etc. - as has been done by the Bench headed by Justice J.S. Verma. Going by the judicial precedents, Justive Verma's Bench has rightly observed: "These Constitution Bench decisions, after a detailed discussion, indicate that no precise meaning can be ascribed to the terms 'Hindu', 'Hindutva' and 'Hinduism'; and no meaning in the abstract can confine it to the narrow limits of religion alone, excluding the content of Indian culture and heritage. It is difficult to appreciate how in the face of these decisions, the term 'Hindutva' or 'Hinduism' per se, in the abstract, can be assumed to mean and be equated with narrow fundamentalist Hindu religious bigotry, or be construed to fall within the prohibition in subsections (3) and/or (3A) of section 123 of the Representation of the People Act. In conclusion, the Bench reiterates: "It is a fallacy and an error of law to proceed on the assumption that any reference to Hindutva or Hinduism in a speech makes it automatically a speech based on Hindu religion as opposed to other religions or that the use of the word Hindutva or Hinduism per se depicts an attitude hostile to all persons practising any religion other than the Hindu religion... and it may well be that these words are used in a speech to emphasise the way of life of the Indian people and the Indian cultural ethos...There is no such presumption permissible in law contrary ot the several Constitution Bench decisions." Clearly, what J.S. Verma's Bench has ruled is so sound, fair and consistent with the previous decisions of the Supreme Court that only a jaundiced eye can find fault with it. To all those commentators for whom it has become a sort of fashion to denounce Hinduism without studying in depth its positive and ennobling features, I would pose a question. Suppose, as a candidate for an election or otherwise, I say that I am a true follower of true Hinduism which, in my view, is nothing but a form of spiritual secularism; which believes that God/Truth can be reached through different routes and by diverse means; which adheres to no fixed dogma; which is based upon principles and not on persons; which continuously endeavours to enlarge the aperture of mind to secure better and better insight and to comprehend Reality in greater and greater depth; which assigns the same spark of divinity to every individual; which treats the spirit of Ram Rajya, that is, the spirit of establishing a fair and just order by fair and just means, as a guiding star for the polity and administration of the State; which practices and propagates that 'Jiva is Shiva', that is, in the service of the living creatures lies the service of the Creator; which is toleran and appreciative of other systems of belief and considers them branches of the same tree; then, which constitutional provision, which constitutional value and in which part of our constitutional scheme do I violate and in what way do I damage the foundational planks of our constitutional edifice or harm the principles of secularism, socialism, democracy or republicanism? Clearly, the answer to the above question is: none. I do not undermine any of the objectives of our Constitution. On the other hand, I help in attainment of these abjectives by providing spiritual underpinnings to them. Unfortunately, it is not being realised in our country that no seed, howsoever potent, can strike roots in dry and dreary land; and no plant, how so ever green, can survive if the environment around it gets polluted. Every institution, every part of our constitutional scheme, has a body and a soul, a structure and an underlying spirit. In the absence of a congenial atmosphere, the structure remains, the spirit has died; the bones exist, the soul has departed. And, when in an inspirational vacuum, we are artificially attemting to "give unto 'Caesar' things that are 'Caesar's and to 'God' things that are 'God's' ", we are doing nothing but corrupting both 'Caesar' and the 'God' and entrusting our maladies for cure, not to the surgeons, but to the butchers. Without spiritual underpinnings, the country's constitutional goals have become unattainable and its institutions are tottering. The country is up to its neck in debt. To foreign creditors alone, it has to repay about $99 billion. Politics is increasingly coming under the sway of criminals and the corrupt. India's intellect is getting more and more disintegrated. Her emotions are being daily debased by the beams from sky. She is being virtually robbed by new agents of new imperialism and pushed, to use the words of T.S. Eliot, "Father from God and nearer to dust". And in "the kingdom of the deaf", to which the country is being increasingly reduced, the common man cries in vain: where is truth? Where is justice? And where is the great India which every leader promised to build at the dawn of independence? The fundamental challenge that the country faces today is how to provide a healthy soil and a healthy climate in which the seeds of her constitution can get embedded deep into her psyche and flower into genuine articles of faith. And this challenge can be met mainly by redefining her cultural heritage and by reconstructing the Hindu thought and by washing out the mud and muck that her culture and religion have accumulated in the course of its long march of 5000 years. The pure has to be separated from the fake and profound from the profane.The gems have to be picked up and the stones thrown away. Only a regenrated culture and re-awakened Hinduism can answer the country's manifold fields. The need for re-invigoration of Hinduism, which has been exposed to ravages of a vast span of history, is obvious. In fact, Hinduism itself recognises that change and dynamism are parts of life and of cosmic reality. It believes that the universe is continuously changing. It has its own creative process, its own self-generating flux. One dynamic equilibrium is continuously giving way to another dynamic equilibrium. It is time we restored the long dynamic equilibrium of Hinduism, rejuvenated it and used it to carve out a new style of social and cultural life, a new design for our polity and administration. A fresh constructive and creative impulse, therefore, needs to be imparted to Hinduism so that it can bring on the scene a new Hindu, a Catholic, compassionate and contemplative Hindu with a clean conscience, a Hindu who cherishes the positive values of our culture, of 'tyaga' and 'tapasya', of 'satyam', 'shivam' and 'sundaram', and is ever-willing to synthesize them, in the highest tradition of Hindu thought of 'moving from a lower level of truth to a higher level of truth', with new knowledge and new perceptions that have since become available to mankind. It is unfortunate that some of the arm-chair, 'one-stance', columnists are attacking the Supreme Court judgement, instead of advocating reforms or religion and culture which can provide substance to our constitutional principles and values and make India really mighty in thoughts, mighty in deeds and mighty in service to humanity. |
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