Majoritarianism
From Wikipedia
Majoritarianism is a traditional political philosophy or
agenda that asserts that a majority (sometimes categorized by religion,
language, social class, or some other identifying factor) of the population is
entitled to a certain degree of primacy in society, and has the right to make
decisions that affect the society. This traditional view has come under growing
criticism and democracies have increasingly included constraints in what the
parliamentary majority can do, in order to protect citizens' fundamental
rights.[1]
This should not be confused with the concept of a
majoritarian electoral system, which is a simple electoral system that usually
gives a majority of seats to the party with a plurality of votes. A parliament
elected by this method may be called a majoritarian parliament (e.g., the
Parliament of the United Kingdom and the Parliament of India).
Under a democratic majoritarian political structure, the
majority would not exclude any minority from future participation in the
democratic process. Majoritarianism is sometimes pejoratively referred to by
its opponents as “ocholocracy” or “tyranny of the majority”. Majoritarianism is
often referred to as majority rule, which may be referring to a majority class
ruling over a minority class, while not referring to the decision process
called majority rule.
Contents [hide]
1 Concept in
depth
2 Types
3 History and
legacy
4 Reform and
backlash
5 See also
6 References
Concept in depth[edit]
Advocates of majoritarianism argue that majority decision
making is intrinsically democratic and that any restriction on majority
decision making is intrinsically undemocratic. If democracy is restricted by a
constitution which cannot be changed by a simple majority decision then
yesterday's majority is being given more weight than today's. If it is
restricted by some small group, such as aristocrats, judges, priests, soldiers,
or philosophers, then society becomes an oligarchy. The only restriction
acceptable in a majoritarian system is that a current majority has no right to
prevent a different majority emerging in the future (this could happen, for
example, if a minority persuades enough of the majority to change its
position). In particular, a majority cannot exclude a minority from future
participation in the democratic process. Majoritarianism does not prohibit a
decision being made by representatives as long as this decision is made via
majority rule, as it can be altered at any time by any different majority
emerging in the future.
One critique of majoritarianism is that systems without
supermajority requirements for changing the rules for voting can be shown to
likely be unstable.[2] Among other critiques of majoritarianism is that most
decisions in fact take place not by majority rule, but by plurality, unless the
voting system artificially restricts candidates or options to two only.[3] In
turn, due to Arrow's paradox, it is not possible to have plurality voting
systems with more than two options that retain adherence to both certain "fairness"
criteria and rational decision-making criteria.[3]
Types[edit]
Majoritarianism, as a concept of government, branches out
into several forms. The classic form includes unicameralism and a unitary
state.
Qualified majoritarianism is a more inclusionary form, with
degrees of decentralization and federalism.
Integrative majoritarianism incorporates several
institutions to preserve minority groups and foster moderate political
parties.[4]
History and legacy[edit]
There are relatively few instances of large-scale majority
rule in recorded history, most notably the majoritarian system of Athenian
democracy and other ancient Greek city-states. However, some argue that none of
those Greek city-states were truly majority rule, particularly due to their exclusion
of women, non-landowners, and slaves from decision-making processes. Most of
the famous ancient philosophers staunchly opposed majoritarianism, because
decisions based on the will of the uneducated and uninformed 'masses' are not
necessarily wise or just. Plato is a prime example with his Republic, which
describes a societal model based on a tripartite class structure.
Anarchist anthropologist David Graeber offers a reason as to
why majority democratic government is so scarce in the historical record.
"Majority democracy, we might say, can only emerge when two factors
coincide: 1. a feeling that people should have equal say in making group
decisions, and 2. a coercive apparatus capable of enforcing those
decisions." Graeber argues that those two factors almost never meet:
"Where egalitarian societies exist, it is also usually considered wrong to
impose systematic coercion. Where a machinery of coercion did exist, it did not
even occur to those wielding it that they were enforcing any sort of popular
will."[5]
Majoritarianism (as a theory), similar to democracy, has
often been used as a pretext by sizable or aggressive minorities to politically
oppress other smaller (or civically inactive) minorities, or even sometimes a
civically inactive majority (see Richard Nixon's reference to the "Silent
Majority" that he asserted supported his policies).
This agenda is most frequently encountered in the realm of
religion: In essentially all Western nations, for instance, Christmas Day—and
in some countries, other important dates in the Christian calendar as well—are
recognized as legal holidays; plus a particular denomination may be designated
as the state religion and receive financial backing from the government
(examples include the Church of England in England and the Lutheran Church in
the Scandinavian countries). Virtually all countries also have one or more
official languages, often to the exclusion of some minority group or groups
within that country who do not speak the language or languages so designated.
In most cases, those decisions have not been made using a majoritarian
referendum, and even in the rare case when a referendum has been used, a new
majority is not allowed to emerge at any time and repeal it.
Reform and backlash[edit]
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TYRANNY OF THE MAJORITY.[6]... In America the majority
raises formidable barriers around the liberty of opinion; within these barriers
an author may write what he pleases, but woe to him if he goes beyond them.
— Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America, Volume I,
Chapter XV (1835)
In recent times—especially beginning in the 1960s—some forms
of majoritarianism have been countered by liberal reformers in many
countries[clarification needed]: in the 1963 case Abington School District v.
Schempp, the United States Supreme Court declared that school-led prayer in the
nation's public schools was unconstitutional, and since then many localities
have sought to limit, or even prohibit, religious displays on public
property.[clarification needed] The movement toward greater consideration for
the rights of minorities within a society is often referred to as
pluralism.[clarification needed]
This has provoked a backlash from some advocates of
majoritarianism, who lament the Balkanization of society they claim has
resulted from the gains made by the multicultural agenda; these concerns were
articulated in a 1972 book, The Dispossessed Majority, written by Wilmot
Robertson. Multiculturalists, in turn, have accused majoritarians of racism and
xenophobia.[citation needed]
See also[edit]
icon Politics portal
Argumentum ad populum
Collectivism
Consensus decision-making
Consensus democracy
Direct democracy
Minoritarianism (opposite)
Minority rights
Popular democracy
Supermajority
Tyranny of the majority
Utilitarian ethics
Democracy versus majoritarian will
Suhrith Parthasarathy
FEBRUARY 28, 2014 00:25 IST
UPDATED: MAY 23, 2016 17:43 IST
To restore India as a liberal democratic nation, it will
require more than a mere conduct of regular, supposedly free and fair,
elections. We will need to shift the goalposts of our attentions to the
fundamental tenets that make a democracy
It is disappointing, and even condemnable, that Penguin
India capitulated to pressure from the Hindu far right in deciding to pulp all
remaining copies of Wendy Doniger’s book The Hindus: An Alternative History.
Penguin’s claims that Indian law — particularly Section 295A of the Indian
Penal Code — makes it “difficult for any Indian publisher to uphold
international standards of free expression without deliberately placing itself
outside the law,” is only partially correct. The law on the subject is often
onerous, and the courts’ interpretation of it is frequently inconsistent making
the battle for free speech not only a difficult one, but also impossible to
predict. Yet, by all reasonable accounts, Ms Doniger’s book, even if a most
conservative reading of the law were employed, would not have been injuncted
from publication. What’s more, the chances of Penguin and the author facing
prosecution under Section 295A were distant and implausible. The publisher’s
reasons for settling, therefore, appear, at best, insincere.
Individual’s right and larger society
But, read together with, among other incidents, Bloomsbury
India’s decision this past January to withdraw copies of The Descent of Air
India, after a complaint for defamation filed by Union Minister Mr. Praful
Patel, Penguin’s choice foretells a dangerous future: one in which publishers
are unwilling to fight the law’s evils. It seems even the supposed vanguards of
free speech are losing faith in the state that we live in — a democracy which
suffers from an ingrained illegitimacy, where a person’s right to free speech
is limited by the majority’s perceived levels of tolerance. To restore India as
a liberal democratic nation, it will require more than a mere conduct of
regular, supposedly free and fair, elections. We will need to shift the
goalposts of our attentions to the fundamental tenets that make a democracy;
our political debate must subsume the philosophy of rights.
It is easy enough to begin any discussion on this matter
with the Constitution of India as anchor, for subject to certain limitations it
grants a right to freedom of speech and expression. But, we would do well to
set aside the document for a moment, and think about what rights a democracy,
properly understood, must guarantee. Our tendency, unfortunately, is to often
think of democracy as a form of majoritarianism, where the will of the greatest
number ought to always prevail; we, therefore, seek to balance an individual’s
right with the supposed interests of the larger society. If restricting certain
speech would make the majority of us happy, then such societal happiness, it is
argued, would constitute good reason for restricting such speech. But this
model for framing the purport of our moral rights, as the legal philosopher
Ronald Dworkin, among others, argued, is fundamentally flawed. It does not
comprehend what democracy, which at its heart is an interpretive concept,
really means.
If democracy were to be a truly legitimate form of
government, it must contain certain inherent value; and since it is difficult
to argue that majoritarianism has any such value over and above its ability to
institutionalise the larger goals of a legitimate government, we must reject
any definition of democracy that rests purely on the rule of the majority. In
other words, democracy cannot be considered an end by itself, but must
represent a means to attain justice. In order to be genuinely participatory,
democracy must entail more than just a commitment to elections; it must treat
certain fundamental rights as distinct and incapable of being transgressed
purely on the caprice of the majority.
Our greatest failing as a nation is to allow whimsical
decisions of the majority to override the most fundamental moral rights that we
enjoy as citizens. When the Indian Constitution says, as it does in Article
19(1)(a), that citizens have a right to freedom of speech and expression, it is
memorialising a particular moral right. The limitations that it places on this
right through Article 19(2) by allowing the State to make reasonable restrictions
in the interests, among other things, of public order, decency or morality, are
therefore to be invoked only when compelling reason is presented. The question
is: what constitutes compelling reason?
The grounds that the Constitution of India provides in
Article 19(2), as its text says, ought to be reasonable. And what is reasonable
is to be tested not on the threshold of majoritarian will, but on larger,
scrupulous standards. For example, it would be reasonable to constrain speech
if it is absolutely apparent that such speech would incite the committing of an
offence. Such a test was, in fact, devised by the U.S. Supreme Court in the
famous Brandenburg v. Ohio case: it is only speech that incites “imminent
lawless action,” the court held, which is constitutionally unprotected.
Extending American law to the Indian context is often
frowned upon, especially in the context of free speech, given that the U.S.
Constitution contains no equivalent of Article 19(2). But it is important to
bear in mind that both the First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution (which for
many decades was thought only to be a bar against prior restraint of speech)
and Article 19(1)(a) of the Indian Constitution are abstract expositions of the
same moral principle. The restrictions that Article 19(2) imposes are,
therefore, to be interpreted on the touchstone of the same moral guidelines. It
is no doubt true that according free speech an absolute status, as in America,
can give rise to a number of problems, where the inherent value of speech is
lost. For example, the U.S. Supreme Court, seemingly with a view to uphold the
First Amendment, allows big corporations to spend unlimited funds on political
advertising, thereby treating companies on a par with real people. Free speech
must unquestionably partake more than the ability of the wealthy to speak, and
the state has an important role to play in achieving this goal. But the
restrictions that the Indian government often places on speech have little to
do with such concerns of equality.
On the contrary, speech is limited in the supposed interest
of the majority on a utilitarian assumption that such restriction benefits the
interests of the larger society. Where the impact of a certain speech is
uncertain, the benefit of doubt must be accorded to the speaker; any divergent,
utilitarian argument would run counter to the theory of rights. Unfortunately,
the Indian Supreme Court — and concomitantly the courts below it — allows our
right to freedom of speech to wither at the first expression of an objection,
where violence is implausible let alone being imminent.
This is not to suggest that the Supreme Court has never
upheld the right to free speech. There have been plenty of instances where the
court has overturned bans on books, movies and other forms of expressions. If
Penguin had indeed lost in the trial court, it is reasonable to presume that
the higher judiciary would have overturned any injunction. But, collectively,
the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence in allowing speech to thrive is so poor as to
make the prospect of restraining prior governmental action or more principled
decisions from the lower judiciary an abandoned dream. The court seems to lack
the philosophical bent of mind to consider certain rights as inviolable, as
superior to the impulses of the majority.
Justifying totalitarian power
Take, for example, its decision in 2007 in Sri Baragur
Ramachandrappa and others v. State of Karnataka and others. Here, the State
government had issued a notification banning Dharmakaarana, a Kannada novel by
Dr. P.V. Narayana on grounds that certain paragraphs in the book were
objectionable, purportedly probing the character of Akkanagamma, the elder
sister of the 12th century saint, Basaveshwara. The Supreme Court, contrary to
questioning the government’s legitimacy in banning the book on dubious grounds
that it hurt the sentiments of the “Veerashaivas,” when there was no threat of
any violence, struck a dagger into the heart of free expression in India.
What’s more, inexplicably, the court suggested that the onus to dislodge and
rebut the government’s opinion that the offending publication was offensive lay
on the novelist. This was a case of the Supreme Court justifying a totalitarian
power at the hands of the state at the cost of our most fundamental rights.
Regrettably, the decision is no aberration, but is symptomatic of the general
approach of the apex court. That the decision represents the law of the land
was made clearer when the Bombay High Court, in 2010, relied on the decision to
uphold a ban on a book, Islam: A Concept of Political World Invasion …. Here,
the court was unequivocal in holding that there needs to exist no clear and
present danger to justify a ban on speech. It suffices to show, the court
wrote, that “the language of the writing is of a nature calculated to promote
feelings of enmity or hatred.”
The Supreme Court in framing its jurisprudence on free
speech from the perspective of restrictions as opposed to the inviolability of
the right has ensured that laws that are blatantly anti-democratic are allowed
to stand. In the process, speech, which, in fact, incites offence, goes
unpunished, while speech, which is found offensive by a given majority, is
constrained on ambiguous grounds. What the court has effectively done is to say
the government is entitled to bar speech when it believes that such constraints
would benefit the community as a whole. These developments threaten not merely
liberty, but democracy too. It is, perhaps, time we took our rights seriously.
(Suhrith Parthasarathy is an advocate in the Madras High
Court.)
